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ABSTRACT
Rating College Debt: A Case Study of Union College
Department of Economics, June 2017.
Advised by: Professor Tomas Dvorak
On Friday, March 3rd President Stephen Ainlay made an announcement of “the largest,
most expensive, most complex project in Union’s history.” President Ainlay is referencing the
massive rebirth of one of Union’s most central academic buildings, Science and Engineering.
The three-phrase building project will take an estimated three years and cost a total of $100
million. About $50 million of this project will be financed through debt. This comes at a time
when, Moody’s, a top rating agency changed the methodology for rating higher education debt.
My thesis explores the impact of the new methodology on Union’s rating. While the elimination
of some criteria like matriculation and selectivity may help Union’s rating, the addition of other
criteria like total wealth negatively impact Union’s standing. I find that even after including $50
million of new debt Union should retain its A1 rating. To strengthen Union’s case for an A1
rating I conduct a peer comparison to help Union navigate Moody’s new rating methodology. I
also explore potential ways to structure the additional debt and discuss the pros and cons of each
option.
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Executive Summary
Why Union’s Rating is Important
Union College, a small private liberal arts college located in Schenectady, NY, plans to
issue $50 million of new money debt to partially cover the costs of a $100 million science and
engineering building. ($40 million of the project costs will be covered by pledges and funds on
hand, and $10 million will be an endowment for the building.)
The last time Union went to market was 2012. Union received a score of A1 from
Moody’s a rating consistent with prior ratings for twenty plus years. In December of 2015,
however, Moody’s published a new Global Higher Education rating methodology. This new
methodology consists of four categories: Market Profile, Operating Performance, Leverage, and
Wealth and Liquidity, given 30%, 25%, 20% and 25% weights respectively. The new
methodology eliminated criteria like matriculation, net tuition per student, average gift per
student, and average debt service coverage. It added new metrics like total wealth, reputation and
pricing power, strategic positioning, leverage, and debt affordability. Understanding Moody’s
new methodology and how it affects Union will be critical in creating a cohesive and pointed
rating presentation to help Union achieve the highest rating possible.
Union’s Preliminary Debt Rating with and Additional $50 million of Debt
Union’s preliminary scorecard outcome with an additional $50 million of debt added is
4.95, which places Union’s preliminary rating in the A1 range. The A1 range spans from 4.5 to
5.5. The new debt will directly impact financial leverage and debt affordability measured by
spendable cash and investment to total debt, and total debt to cash flow respectively. Please see
the scorecard below for an overview of Union’s preliminary scorecard according to FY16.
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The new debt also has the potential to impact a criteria under the Market Profile category,
strategic positioning. Strategic positioning is the only qualitative factor in Moody’s new
methodology. Therefore, since strategic positioning is a measurement of things like board
effectiveness and successful planning, the additional debt could be perceived as risky to Union’s
overall financial position and plan. Union should prepare to discuss their overall strategic vision,
and the role the new S&E project plays in that vision. Additionally, Union should discuss its
weakest metric, revenue diversity with an alphanumerical score of Baa during its rating
presentation. I believe Union has a strong case to show Moody’s that Union has improved in this
area and also that Union’s revenues are diverse in this area because of programmatic and
geographic diversity.
Peer Analysis
Bates, Franklin & Marshall (F&M), Colby, Hamilton, and Bucknell, are considered close
peers with Union because the size of their student bodies, location in the northeast, ranking near
Union in U.S. News and World Report rankings, and status as private not-for-profit four-year
colleges. Bates and F&M were also most recently rated A1 by Moody’s, and Hamilton, Colby,
and Bucknell are currently rated two-notches above Union at Aa2. The chart below overviews
Union compared to these five peers according to FY16 based on Moody’s published scorecard.

Union’s strength relative to peers is driven by two key aspects of its financial statements:
consistent increases in operating income and relatively low debt outstanding compared to peers.
These two financial aspects drive Union to be on par with, or outperform more highly rated peer
institutions in five factors: scope of operations, reputation and pricing power, operating results,
operating reserve, and debt affordability. Union’s increasing operating revenue is largely
attributed to increases in private gifts and grants, which increased 236% from FY2011 to
FY2016. Union can explain that this was a deliberate act of strategic planning to improve its
revenue diversity, increase funds on hand, and increase alumni giving percentages. Union’s
lower debt outstanding and strong scores in criteria related to debt help support Union’s case that
taking on additional debt is fiscally responsible, as well as a wise strategic move.
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Peer colleges rated more highly outperform relative to Union in three factors: liquidity,
financial leverage, and total wealth. Union’s liquidity is strong at 594 days, putting it in the Aa
alphanumerical range for this factor. Peers, however, have even better liquidity than Union, but
this is not a major concern. Financial leverage, measured by spendable cash and investments to
total debt, and total wealth, measured by total cash and investments, are clearly tied to one
another. Both measurements use cash and investments. This is where Union’s smaller
endowment is reflected in the scorecard. Union’s endowment, valued at $432 million in FY16 is
about half the size of Hamilton, Bucknell, and Colby’s endowments at $883 million, $817
million, and $925 million respectively. The magnitude of Union’s endowment in relation to peer
colleges is Union’s biggest concern financially. This concern is exacerbated because Union’s
endowment return of about -9.0% was cited by Bloomberg as the worst endowment return
among the “little Ivies.”
Discussing Union’s plans to generate positive endowment returns in the future and the
positive trends on larger scale should help mitigate the endowment concerns. Integrating positive
aspects of Union strategic planning like its more than 16% increase in applications since 20112012, strong retention rates around 93%, and differentiating factor as a liberal arts school with a
robust engineering program. Additionally, comparing criteria where Union outperforms
compared to peers, such as those related to operating revenue and debt affordability, will position
Union well to maintain its prior rating of A1.
Debt Structuring Recommendation
Although there are infinite ways to structure Union’s additional debt, I think the structure
outlined below, or a structure that uses the same primary ideas, is the best option.
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This structure issues $10 million of short-term debt, the maximum advised by Union’s
underwriter. According to Union’s scheduled pledges designated for the S&E project, the
entirety of the short-term debt principal will be offset by the pledge payments. The debt follows
the pre-existing staircase structure (increasing principal as the maturities become longer) up to
2029, followed by another staircase leading to the 2037 Series 2008 term bond payment.
Lowering the debt after 2029 will leave more flexibility for future debt issues because Union
could easily handle additional debt layered on top of the existing debt in the years 2030 and
beyond. The remaining debt, about $15.6 million, could be issued as a long-term term bond with
mandatory sinking fund payments. Based on recently priced higher education deals, market
conditions for issuing term bonds are good. Haverford College, rated AA- by S&P and Fitch
issued three large long-term term bonds with 5.0% interest rates during their debt issue on
February 28th of this year. This further supports that Union could help keep upcoming payments
lower by issuing a large term bond for potentially little additional cost in terms of the interest
rate on the bond. Therefore, this option takes Union’s current finances and pledges into
consideration, maintains flexibility by issuing less debt in the mid years, and lowers upfront costs
by issuing a large long-term term bond.
Following this executive summary is the analysis that led me to make these
recommendations and conclusions about Union’s potential debt rating and debt structure. In the
first chapter I review the basics of public finance, the importance of debt ratings, and the new
rating methodologies. I use Moody’s scorecard outlined in their Global Higher Education rating
methodology to arrive at a preliminary score of A1. In the following chapter I compare Union to
its group of five peer institutions. After calculating their preliminary rating outcomes using the
same process, I examine Union’s strengths and areas of concern relative to its peer group. I also
give recommendations on how to navigate these areas of concern, including Moody’s new
qualitative criteria, strategic positioning. Finally, I review three options for structuring Union’s
additional debt based on a framework to achieve a balance of short-term to long-term debt, the
best sustainability from a financial perspective, an absence of concentration of the debt, and also
taking current market conditions into account. After reviewing some recent higher education
deals I make a final recommendation for the debt structure of the new deal. My analysis supports
that the S&E capital project is reasonable from a financial standpoint and should not damage
Union’s credit even with the new rating methodology. The reinvigoration of S&E has the
potential to better Union’s competitive edge as a liberal arts school with strong STEM programs
without deteriorating Union’s financial position.
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Chapter 1: Estimating a Credit Rating for Union College
1.1 Background on Bonds, Municipal Bonds, and Credit Ratings
A bond is, by its most basic definition, a loan. The seller of the bond, or the “issuer,”
pays the buyer of the bond, or the “investor,” the loan plus some stream of interest at a set date in
the future (Law 2016). The date when the initial amount of the bond, or the principal, is paid
back to the investor is considered the maturity of the bond. The interest rate the issuer pays on
the bond is called the coupon. The price is determined as the present value of both the income
stream from the interest and the amount paid back at maturity. Therefore, one method of
determining price is adding the present value of the cash flows. Exhibit 1 describes this equation.
Exhibit 1: Bond Pricing Equation
𝑃=

𝐶
𝐶
𝐶
𝑀
+
+
⋯
+
1 + 𝑖 1 + 𝑖(
1 + 𝑖*
1 + 𝑖*

In Exhibit 1, “P” is the price of the bond, “C” is the coupon payment, “i” is the interest rating,
“M” is the principal, and “n” is the “nth” time period.
When a state, local government, or other certified issuer issues bonds it is considered a
“municipal bond.” The primary difference between corporate bonds, i.e., bonds issued by
cooperate entities, and municipal bonds is that the income stream from municipal bonds is
normally federally tax-exempt (and frequently state and locally tax-exempt), whereas the income
stream from cooperate bonds is taxable. Therefore, investors are willing to accept lower interest
payments since the income stream is tax exempt, and issuers benefit because they pay lower
interest payments on their debt. Consider, for example, two bonds: A, which is taxable, and B,
which is tax-exempt. Let’s assume a 30% tax-bracket and that both bonds have the same
probability of default. If bond A paid $100 a month, the real income steam is actually $70
(because 30% of $100 is $30, leaving the investor with $70). Thus, if that same investor is
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deciding whether to invest in a tax-exempt bond instead, any payment greater than $70 would be
a better investment.
The relationship between taxable and tax-exempt bonds explains the relationship between
the U.S. Treasury yield curve and the Municipal Market Data curve (MMD, the relevant yield
curve in municipal issues). MMD theoretically lies below the Treasury yield curve at a rate equal
to one’s tax rate, because investors are willing to accept lower interest payments.
Other certified municipal issuers that are not governments are those entities that can
claim a tax-exempt status. For example, primary education systems, higher-education systems,
hospitals, sports arenas, and other not-for-profits can issue tax-exempt debt. The U.S. tax code
under section 501.c3 allows for not-for-profits to issue tax-exempt debt (SIFMA 2011).
Municipal bonds are issued for two primary reasons: to finance a new project or to
refinance existing debt. When the bonds are issued to finance a project, i.e., a state government
building a new highway, the bond issue is considered to be, “new money.” In the case of bonds
refinancing old bonds, the issue is aptly called a, “refinancing” (Hoffland 1972). When the bonds
are initially sold that is considered the “primary bond market,” whereas when the investor resells
a bond, or trades it, this is considered the “secondary bond market” (SIFMA 2011).
There are two ways to sell bonds: through a competitive sale or a negotiated sale. In a
competitive sale investors submit sealed bids to the issuer whereas in a negotiated sale, a “senior
banker” or “lead banker” is chosen from a selection process to buy the entirety of the bond issue
from the Issuer at such a price that the bank can then sell the bonds on the market. A negotiated
sale offers the issuer more debt structuring flexibility and access to banking professionals who
can introduce new ideas to financing the given project (SIFMA 2011).
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Competitive sales are less common than negotiated (Bond Buyer, 2016). The process,
however, is arguably simpler. The issuer simply announces the sale, normally on Bond Buyer, then
there is a period when investors place bids on the debt issue. The issuers then take whichever bids
result in the lowest cost of capital (SIFMA 2011).
When any Issuer, whether it be municipal or corporate, decides to come to market, or
issue debt, they have the option of paying for a credit rating(s) from a rating agency. These
ratings serve as an endorsement for the debt when the rating is good, and warn investors of
potential concern when the rating is below investment grade. Therefore, the rating agencies help
close the problem of asymmetrical information between the sellers and the buyers (Langohor
2016). The primary agencies are Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. Each agency assigns
ratings on somewhat different scales given in Exhibit 2.
Exhibit 2: Credit Rating Scales from Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch

Therefore, the top rating, AAA or Aaa, is considered to be the most secure, or the least
likely to default, whereas the bottom category, D or C indicates default. Since ratings are
considered an indicator of risk, they also help determine return, or interest rate. Investors demand
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a higher coupon on bonds that are perceived as more-risky, as compensation for the additional
risk they are taking on. Hite and Warga (1997) found this relationship to be true in the case of
rating downgrades (that is an issuer moving down on the rating scale). They studied issuers in
the 12 months prior to a downgrade and in the 12 months after a downgrade, and found that
issuers were forced to compensate investors with significantly higher interest rates after the
downgrade as opposed to the 12 months prior. Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) found
similar findings from their study of the announcements of downgrades from Moody’s and S&P.
Therefore, ratings are an important aspect to consider both from an investor perspective, to
measure risk and return, and from an issuer’s perspective to try to keep the cost of capital as low
as possible. From this investor perspective, it is advantageous to obtain the highest rating
possible in order to obtain the lowest cost of capital.
1.2 Higher-Education Borrowing
According to U.S. News and World report the average size of a College or University
endowment in America in fiscal year 2015 was $355 million (Kowarski 2016). With access to
funds of that magnitude, many may wonder why College and Universities issue debt via
negotiated or competitive debt sales to finance new building projects. The basic answer is that an
endowment is normally made up of hundreds or even thousands of smaller funds, which are
normally designated for specific purposes (Smith 2015). Some funds are solely for financial aid,
a specific scholarship fund, or a specific department. These specialized funds restrict a college
or university board from accessing enough funds to undertake large building or renovation
projects on a college campus. Therefore, when colleges and universities cannot raise enough
unrestricted funds, i.e., annual funds, or money specific to the project from large donors, they
must issue debt in order to complete the project. There are also industry wide expectations to
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maintain a sizable endowment as a cushion for times of financial stress and as an indicator of a
long legacy and prestige.
1.3 Tax-Exempt Debt Regulations
Since Colleges and Universities are in the higher-education category they are given a taxexempt status under the IRS code section 501 (c) (3) (SIFMA 2011). This allows colleges and
universities the option to issue tax-exempt debt, thus obtaining a lower cost of capital. Despite
this benefit, issuing tax-exempt debt comes with regulations and restrictions.
The MSRB, or Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board establishes rules for issuing taxexempt debt. The MSRB rules are too numerous and complicated to discuss fully here. The rules
are in fact so detailed that all negotiated deals must have an independent lawyer, called Bond
Counsel to review the issuer to make sure it is legal (EMMA 2011).
Here are some of the most important regulations. Firstly, the project, or the thing the new
debt is financing, cannot include a taxable income generating entity. For example, issuers cannot
build a new tax-exempt study facility with rental space for a taxable coffee store in it. Secondly,
issuers must follow the laws and regulations, as to not commit arbitrage: the issuer cannot invest
the proceeds of the bond deal at an interest rate higher than the arbitrage yield. Thirdly, there are
different regulations for calling tax-exempt bonds out of the market. Tax-exempt bonds can only
be called prior to the call date period once. This is called an Advanced Refunding (MSRB 2016).
The MSRB states under the Refunding section:
In an advance refunding, the issuer sells new bonds and places the proceeds into an escrow
account. Thus, the advance refunded bonds are not paid off immediately, but instead are paid
off either as originally scheduled at maturity or on an earlier redemption date in the future
according to the bonds' redemption, or "call," provisions. The Federal tax code generally
provides that a bond issue may be advance refunded only once (although bonds issued prior to
1986 may be advance refunded twice)
The provision for only allowing one Advanced Refunding is because the bonds are essentially no
longer a liability of the issuer since the escrow pays for the payments due on the bonds.
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These regulations only serve as a few of the most principal examples of the complex
regulations that must be understood and met by issuers of tax-exempt debt. These restrictions are
an additional cost or hindrance to consider when deciding whether to issue tax-exempt or taxable
debt.
1.4 The Higher-Education Bond Market
The market for college and university debt is a significant portion of municipal debt.
According to Bond Buyer, in 2015 the volume of long-term debt issues related to education
(which includes all levels of education through college) was nearly $125 billion, while the entire
dollar amount of tax-exempt issues in 2015 was $398 billion (Bond Buyer 2016). Therefore,
education comprised 31.4% of the municipal market in 2015.
The market for municipal debt in the education sector increased considerably. Since
1986, for example, the annual issue of long-term education related debt increased nearly 80.4%
(Bond Buyer 2016). The number of annual education related deals increased 144% since 1986
(Bond Buyer 2016).
Thus, it can be argued that education related debt is increasing in terms of market share
of municipal debt since the number of issues and the magnitude of issues increased substantially.
1.5 Introduction to New Methodologies
After the financial crisis of 2008 unraveled it became apparent that rating agencies were
partially to blame for the financial disaster (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011). The
rating agencies, like the banks had issues of moral hazard and transparency. As a result of the
rating agencies role in the financial crisis, rating agencies are subjected to harsher regulations by
the Securities and Exchange Commission via the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (effective 2010 (EMMA 2016). Dodd-Frank requires that rating agencies publish
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rating methodologies so that investors, bankers, and issuers can discern how ratings are
determined. The following describes Moody’s and S&P’s new rating methodologies for higher
education debt (published in November 2015 and January 2016 respectively).
1.6 Moody’s Global Higher Education Rating Methodology
November 23, 2015 Moody’s published a new Global Higher Education rating
methodology. The new methodology explains Moody’s approach and criteria for rating highereducation debt in and outside of the United States. This methodology states, “This report
includes a scorecard that can be used to approximate credit profiles within the higher education
sector” (Kedem 2015 p 3). It should be noted that although the scorecard provides a relatively
good approximation for the credit risk associated with a particular issuer, and thus its credit
rating, Moody’s reserves the right to weight other factors not listed in the methodology. Despite
that Moody’s may consider other factors, there are four main segments Moody’s analyzes:
Market Profile, Operating Performance, Wealth and Liquidity, and Leverage. Exhibit 3 describes
the subcategories in each segment and the weight typically assigned to each category and the
factors used to evaluate each category.
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Exhibit 3: Moody’s Global Higher Education Scorecard Factors

Wealth
and
Liquidity
(25%)

Operating
Performance
(25%)

Market
Profile
(30%)

Broad Category & Weight

Sub Categories & Weights

Factor Criteria

Scope of Operations (15%)

Operating revenue

Reputation and Pricing Power (5%)

Annual change in operating revenue

Strategic Positioning (10%)

Broad criteria, including capital and
financials plans

Operating Results and Budgetary
Flexibility (10%)

Operating cash flow margin

Revenue Diversity (15%)

Percentage of revenues from its
largest revenue stream

Total wealth (20%)

Total cash and investments and
Spendable Cash & Investments to
Operating expenses

Lever
age
(20%
)

Liquidity (5%)
Financial Leverage (10%)
Debt affordability (10%)

Monthly days cash on hand
Spendable cash and investments to
total debt
Total debt to cash flow

After computing each factor criteria for the most recent fiscal year, Moody’s compares each
factor to predetermined brackets. If, for example, annual change in operating revenue is greater
than or equal to 4%, but less than 6%, the issuer receives a rating of A for this factor which then
corresponds to a score of 6 for this category. Thus, each factor is given an overall score, and the
weighted average corresponds to an overall rating. The lower the overall weighted score, the
higher the rating.
All factors but one from Exhibit 3 are calculated from an issuer’s annual financial
statements. Thus, Moody’s rating methodology is focused primarily on balance sheet and income
statement analysis. Moody’s prior higher education rating methodology took other factors about
the school into account. For example, Moody’s old higher education methodology took other
factors like matriculation and selectivity into account. Therefore, credit ratings under the old
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methodology would be more related to say, U.S. News and World Report Rankings, which puts
primary emphasis on things like selectivity, retention rates, median incoming SAT and ACT
scores, and other factors related to the quality of education. Moody’s new methodology treats
higher education issuers more like businesses. Even the one non-financial factor, strategic
positioning, is related to the issuer’s plans to better the issuer’s financial position in the future
and the effectiveness of its strategies.
1.7 S&P Rating Methodology: Not-For-Profit Public and Private Colleges and Universities
S&P also established new methodologies for higher education issuers, however, S&P
publishes distinct methodologies for each type of higher education issuer. This particular
methodology was effective January 6, 2016. S&P’s rating methodology operates under the same
basic idea as Moody’s. As opposed to four sections, however, there are two: Enterprise Profile
and Financial Profile, which are given equal weight. Exhibit 4 describes the Not-For-Profit
Public and Private College and University rating methodology.
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Exhibit 4: Not-For-Profit Public and Private College and University rating methodology
Broad Category & Weight

Sub Categories & Weights

Enterprise Profile
(50%)

Industry Risk (10%)

Financial Profile
(50%)

Economic Fundamentals (10%)

Factor Criteria
Global higher education rated 2 by
S&P
GDP per capita

Market Position and Demand (70%)

Selectivity, retention rates, other
demand factors, matriculations, FTE
(full time enrollment)

Management and Governance (10%)

Strategic positioning, risk and
financial management, organizational
effectiveness, and governance

Financial Management Policies
(10%)
Financial Performance (20%)
Financial Resources (35%)
Debt and Contingent Liability Profile
(35%)
Debt affordability (10%)

Transparency, reserve and liquidity,
investment management, long-term
planning, and debt management
policies
Operating margin, debt service,
depreciation, and plant renewal
Overall leverage and available
resources
MADS and available resources to
total debt
Total debt to cash flow

Unlike Moody’s Global Higher Education methodology, S&P’s methodology described above
takes many non-financial factors into account. Factors like matriculation and selectivity that
Moody’s completely eliminated are still measured by S&P. Additionally, the overarching risk of
the industry, in this case higher education, is evaluated and the area in which the issuer is located
is assessed using GDP per capita.
Like Moody’s methodology each factor corresponds to a score, which is then weighted
and results in an indicative score. However, S&P then takes into account “overriding factors and
caps” into consideration. Financial trends over the last three years are taken into account. If, for
example, operating revenue is continually growing at a steady rate the issuer may receive a
“bump” up on its financial profile. S&P also explicitly takes peer analysis into account. Other
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adjustments are made for things like strong student to faculty ratios, and a high percentage of
faculty with PhDs (S&P Global Methodology 2016 p 8)
1.8 Comparison of Moody’s and S&P’s Rating Methodologies
It is reasonable to conclude from a comparison of Exhibit 3 and 4 that S&P takes a more
holistic approach to its methodology than Moody’s. Moody’s indicative score is based 90% on
financials, whereas S&P’s indicative score is only 50% financials, and ratings are routinely
adjusted for many additional factors and trends. This is not to say S&P’s approach is superior to
Moody’s, just simply that the different structures of the rating methodologies will affect issuers
credit ratings based on where the issuer’s strengths and weaknesses lie.
Since the S&P and Moody’s rating methodologies differ considerably it is important for
issuers to be aware of the differences and weigh which methodology will likely result in a higher
rating. Moody’s and S&P project that only 5% and 8%, of issuers respectively will be affected
by the rating methodology changes (Kedem 2015 p 3) (S&P Global Methodology 2016 p2). It is
still important, however, for issuers who have only been evaluated by one or the other to
consider switching agencies, or adding a rating to reap the benefits of the different rating
approach.
However, due to the proximity of the deal being a few months away, and the preexisting
relationship and familiarity with Moody’s, Union College decided to continue obtaining rating
only from Moody’s for its next deal. The remainder of the discussion will be in regards to
Moody’s Global Higher Education rating Methodology.
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1.9 Introduction to Union College
Union College, (Union, or the college) located in Schenectady, NY is the oldest private
liberal arts college in the U.S. (officially chartered in 1795). The College enrolls roughly 2,200
students, and is governed by Union’s President, along with its Board of Trustees (Union.edu
2017). Union College plans to issue new debt for a new money project during the 2016 - 2017
academic-year. The new money project will finance the building of a new Science and
Engineering building (herein S&E). The new S&E building aligns with Union’s strategic goals to
maintain its position as a leading liberal arts school with a strong engineering program. The
overall cost of the building project will be $100 million. $10 million of the project will be paid
with funds on hand, and another $40 will be paid for through pledges, and $10 million will serve
as an endowment for the building. This leaves $50 million of the project cost unpaid. This
portion of the cost will be paid for by the new debt. Therefore, the college should be aware of
Moody’s new rating methodology and how it will impact their rating, and thus cost of
borrowing.
Union is currently rated A1, an investment grade rating, as of 2012 (EMMA 2016).
Moody’s recognizes some of Union’s strengths including, 50% and 30% increases of financial
resources and cash and investments in FY2014 and FY2015 respectively, Union’s low risk debt
structure, and Union’s strong engineering program, a differentiating factor from peer institutions
in the Northeast. Moody’s cites, however, Union’s dependence on student charges for 73% of its
revenues as its largest challenge (Sharma, Gephardt 2012). Considering Union has not been rated
since 2012, and the magnitude of this debt issue is substantially larger than any recent deal in the
past decade, obtaining the best rating possible is a crucial aspect of obtaining the lowest cost of
capital possible.
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1.10 Primary Questions
The following questions will guide my thesis with the ultimate goal of making two
primary recommendations to Union: how Union should position its credit story to rating
agencies, and structures Union should consider when structuring its new debt.
1. What is Union’s projected rating using Moody’s new rating methodology?
2. How does Union’s projected rating compare to peer institutions?
3. How should Union position its strengths and areas of concern to rating agencies?
4. What considerations should Union make when structuring the debt?
The above four questions will ultimately lead to recommendations to Union on how to approach
its credit rating and the structuring of its $50 million of new debt.
1.11 Data Used for Analysis
According to regulatory requirements established by the Electronic Municipal Market
Access (EMMA), which is under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
(MSRB), all issuers must enter a Continuing Disclosure Agreement (EMMA 2016). The
Continuing Disclosure Agreement is found in the official offering statements for any issuer post
2012 when the regulation was implemented. This agreement requires issuers to post all available
financial data on EMMA, minimally for the past five fiscal years to the present. Thus, any
college or university that issues debt must post their annual financial statements publically to
EMMA’s website.
Unfortunately, the financial information is not loaded in a spreadsheet that can easily be
uploaded for analysis, but rather the financial statements are simply the PDFs of the final
statements. This makes analyzing multiple schools for peer analysis at one time difficult because
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each PDF must be meticulously transcribed into excel before the relevant factors from Exhibits 3
and 4 can be calculated for the scorecards.
The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) offers a public online
database with the financial and relevant nonfinancial data for colleges and universities in the
United States. Initially, I planned to download all the financial data for every not-for-profit fouryear institution in the Northeast and calculate the relevant financial ratios using “R”, a statistical
computing program. This would have allowed me to create medians for key indicators. For
example, if the median change in operating revenue was 5% between FY2014 and FY2015,
Union’s change in operating revenue, which is above 5%, could be identified as a credit strength
to the rating agencies.
The IPEDS dataset, however, cannot be used for this analysis. Differences in accounting
from school to school make it impossible. For example, Union College and Bucknell University
use the same independent auditor, KPMG, to review their annual financials. Even with the same
company auditing the financials, however, there are considerable differences. For example, the
second line of Union’s income statement is “Pledges receivable, net.” This is an important line
item because when calculating ratios pertaining to leverage, like spendable cash and investments
to total debt, “Pledges receivable, net” must be added back into the numerator according to the
methodologies of Moody’s and S&P. Bucknell, however, does not report this line item as
directly as Union. Bucknell lumps “Pledges receivable, net” into a line item called, “Inventories,
prepaid expenses, and other assets Accounts and other receivables, net.” The necessary line item
for the calculation is found in an appendix to the financials. The differences in accounting
between colleges and universities occur frequently. Some schools, like Hamilton College, lump
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amortization and depreciation together, while most other schools list them separately. Other key
line items that are reported differently include:
•

Total Debt, which is sometimes listed separately and sometimes lumped together with
other liabilities

•

Funds Held in Trust, which is sometimes listed in the balance sheet and other times
listed in an appendix

•

Investments, which are sometimes listed as many separate line items that must be added
together or sometimes as a single item.

The numerous differences in accounting make it impossible to align a single IPEDS variable to
the line items for various higher education issuers. To identity which IPEDS variable
corresponds to issuers’ financials, each issuer’s financials must be separately evaluated and
manipulated. The problem was further enhanced because IPEDS does not report some key
variables necessary to calculate the financial ratios for the scorecards. For example, IPEDS does
not have a variable that measures “Amortization” or “Cash and Cash Equivalents”, two key
components to many financial ratio calculations. Thus, the IPEDS data was deemed unusable for
the purpose of conducting peer analysis and creating financial medians.
The most viable option for financial data was downloading each issuer’s financial
statements from EMMA and transcribing the information by hand. I created a comprehensive
spreadsheet for each institution with its financial data for fiscal years 2014-2016 and the past five
fiscal years for Union. This information can be found in Appendix A.
For other key non-financial metrics I used Common Data Set Initiative reports for Union
and its peers. All schools that partake in the initiative report information on admissions,
graduation rates and degrees, retention, and programs. I used this data to analyze strategic
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positioning trends. The key variables I used from this source were: graduation rate, total
applications, total admitted, total enrolled, and percentage of students in each program area. This
raw information is also located in Appendix A.
1.12 Methodology for Calculating Preliminary Ratings
My methodology goal was simple: recreate the scorecards for Moody’s based on its
rating methodology as closely as possible to simulate the actual preliminary rating scores. The
rating methodology provides the necessary information to recreate scorecard.
As mentioned in section 1.2, Moody’s scorecard measures 10 factors, 9 of which are
based on the financial statements. Moody’s outlines ranges for scoring that corresponds to each
factor. Exhibit 5 gives an example of Moody’s ranges.
Exhibit 5: Ranges for Operating Revenue ($000) According to Moody’s Methodology

Factor
Operating
Revenue
($000)

Weight

Aaa

Aa

A

Baa

Ba

B

Caa

Ca

15%

≥ 2,700,000

< 2,700,000
≥ 400,000

< 400,000
≥ 75,000

< 75,000
≥ 40,000

< 40,000
≥ 30,000

< 30,000
≥ 20,000

< 20,000
≥ 80,000

<
8,000

For example, if an issuer had operating revenue ($000) equal to $85,000, then the issuer would
score A for this factor. Therefore, once the financial ratios are calculated it is relatively easy to
apply the methodology to evaluate how the issuer would score for that given factor.
This process was simplified by creating an automated scorecard that pulls the calculated
ratios and evaluates them according to the relevant ranges. For example, Exhibit 6 shows the
calculation used to evaluate operating revenue.
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Exhibit 6: Sample Calculation Used to Evaluate Operating Revenue
=IF(C24 >= 2700000, "Aaa", IF( C24 >= 400000, "Aa", IF(C24 >= 75000, "A", IF(C24 >=
40000, "Baa", IF(C24 >= 30000, "Ba", IF(C24 >= 20000, "B", IF(C24 >= 8000, "Caa",
IF(C24 < 8000, "Ca"))))))))
The reference to “C24” is the cell, which pulls the operating revenue ratio. Each alphanumerical
score corresponds to a numerical value.
Exhibit 7: Numerical values to Alphanumerical Scores

Aaa

Aa

A

Baa

Ba

B

Caa

Ca

1

3

6

9

12

15

18

20

Following the example from above, if an issuer scored an alphanumerical value of “A” for
operating revenue, which is the measure for the “Scope of operations category”, the score for this
factor would be 6. The score in each category is weighted according to the rating methodology.
For example, In Exhibit 4 operating revenue is given 15% weight.
Moody’s measures one nonfinancial factor called strategic positioning. Strategic
positioning is a qualitative factor that measures reputation and effectiveness of the issuer’s
governance. Please see Appendix A for the rubric Moody’s uses to assign an alphanumerical
rating for this factor. This factor involves a judgment call. It is hard to distinguish the difference
between “strong diversification” and “highly diversified” for example. For this reason, I typically
looked through rating reports to see how Moody’s referenced a college’s strategic plan or the
strength of its governance for guidance on this factor. I also used metrics from common data set
reporting to guide my judgement on assigning scores for the strategic planning criteria. It will
become apparent later that this factor is a key component to maintain Union’s current A1 rating
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and will be discussed in depth in the section discussing Union’s positioning to credit rating
agencies.
Exhibit 8: Moody’s Scorecard Outcome

All of the weighted factor scores are added to produce an aggregate weighted factor
score. The lower the aggregate weighted factor score, the higher the rating. Exhibit 8 displays
Moody’s final scorecard outcome as they relate to the aggregated weight factor scores.
Therefore, if a final aggregate weight score for an issuer is 4.8, the issuer should receive a rating
of A1. As mentioned in Section 1.2, the rating agencies reserve the right to adjust ratings for
additional credit strengths or weakness that are not listed in the methodology. Differences
between aggregated weighted factor score and actual rating will be discussed further in the
discussion of findings.
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1.13 Union College Findings
Based on Union’s FY2016 financial statements and nonfinancial data retrieved from
Union’s Common Data Set reports, Union’s preliminary score, with the addition of $50 million
of debt is 4.95.
An aggregate score of 4.95, corresponds to a rating of A1, and in fact fall in the middle of
the A1 range of 4.5 to 5.5. This signifies a maintenance of Union’s most recent and historical
rating. Exhibit 9 shows Union’s scorecard outcome according to its FY2016 financial statements.
Exhibit 9: Union’s Moody’s Scorecard According to FY2016 Financial Statements

The effect of $50 million of additional debt directly impacts two factors. First, financial leverage,
measured by spendable cash and investments to total debt, decreases from 2.6 times to 1.8 times
since debt is in the denominator thus reducing the ratio. Second, debt affordability, measured by
total debt to cash flow, increases from 3.5 times to 5.0 times because in this ratio debt is in the
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numerator. The new debt, however, could also indirectly impact strategic positioning. Adding an
additional $50 million of debt to Union’s existing $116 million outstanding currently may be
seen as a poor strategic move. Thus, aiming to achieve a, “Very Good” outcome or better in the
strategic positioning criteria could be crucial to obtaining an A1 credit rating because a lower
score has the potential to push Union’s aggregate score higher towards an A2 rating.
As indicated in Exhibit 9, Union scores A or better in every alphanumerical factor aside
from revenue diversity. Revenue diversity, however, is a significant outlier with an
alphanumerical score of Baa. The relevant financial ratio for revenue diversity is measured by
maximum single contribution, that is the percentage of revenues accounted for by the largest
stream of revenues. Union relies heavily on student tuition and fees for revenue. Roughly 70% of
revenues come from student tuition and fees. To a rating agency this poses a problem because if
there is some sort of event that deters students from attending the college, the majority of
revenues used to repay investors is gone.
Union’s strongest categories are: reputation and pricing power, operating results,
operating reserve, and liquidity. Union’s Aaa factor score for reputation and pricing power is
because of Union’s high annual change in operating revenue. Union’s operating revenues
steadily rose in the past five fiscal years. Operating revenues grew around almost 8% between
FY2013 and FY2014, almost 11% between FY2014 and FY2015, nearly 16% between FY2015
and FY2016. The positive change in revenue was driven by rises in three main revenue streams:
tuition and fees, room and board, and private gifts and grants. The most significant growth was
in the private gifts and grants category with 236% growth since FY2011. The drastic growth in
private gifts and grants can be largely attributed to a giving campaign led by the current
president, President Stephen Ainlay. The operating results category was also strong. Operating
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results is measured by operating cash flow margin, commonly used to measure effectiveness of
financial management. An operating cash flow margin of nearly 27% suggests that Union’s
management policies and financial plans align with revenue and expenditure growth goals.
Union’s operating reserve and liquidity metrics are also strong. Operating reserve, as
measured by spendable cash to operating expenses is 3.6 times. This shows Union can operate
without additional wealth. Liquidity, as measured by days cash on hand, is strong at 594 days.
Union’s liquidity is consistently strong and cited as a strength by Moody’s (Sharma, Gephardt
2012).
Although Union’s preliminary weighted scorecard outcome returns a score of 4.95 and a
preliminary rating of A1, this is not to say Union will undoubtedly maintain its prior rating.
Moody’s states that almost all final ratings are within one or two notches of the preliminary
scorecard ratings (Kedem 2015 pg. 15). If a debt issue is a negotiated deal, as this deal is, it is not
uncommon for the lead banking team on the deal to put together a rating agency presentation for
the relevant rating agencies. One tactic used by underwriters is to compare the college to peer
institutions to highlight the relevant issuer’s strengths and discuss how weaknesses are being
addressed in order to obtain a higher rating. Therefore, Union’s presentation of its credit story to
Moody’s is of critical importance to maintain an A1 rating. Thus, it seems appropriate to
compare Union to peer institutions to enhance its credit story.
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Chapter 2: Peer Analysis
2.1 Identifying a Peer Group
The first step in conducting peer analysis is choosing a peer group. In choosing a peer group I
considered the following factors:
•

Location: in the Northeast

•

Type of School: Not-For-Profit Private 4-year Institution, Co-Ed

•

Size: Enrolls fewer than 5,000 students

•

Reputation: Ranking above 40 on U.S. News and World Report

Location is important because the economic landscape changes considerably across the country.
The Northeast is generally wealthier than the southern regions or middle regions of the country
and therefore would not provide a good comparison. The type of school is important because
Moody’s identifies specific methodologies for each different type of higher education institutions
(i.e. Universities vs. Colleges). Therefore, to compare Union’s estimated Moody’s score to other
schools, they must be not-for-profit private 4-year institutions. Size is important for similar
reasons. Size is also highly linked to revenue and other financial indicators, considering most
schools rely heavily on tuition and fees for revenue. Finally, reputation is important because if
schools are of a similar reputation they will be considered closer substitutes in the college
market. This means they will have a similar demand base, which affects selectivity, retention,
matriculation, and other demand related factors.
Given the above criteria I identified, Bates College, Hamilton College, Colby College,
Franklin and Marshall College (F&M), and Bucknell University as peer institutions for Union
College. Exhibit 10 gives a brief comparison of Union to the five peer institutions.
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Exhibit 10: Selection of Peers

School

Enrollment

Location

U.S. New & World
Report Ranking

Union
Bates
Hamilton
Colby
F&M
Bucknell

2,269
1,792
1,872
1,857
2,249
3,569

Schenectady, NY
Lewiston, ME
Clinton, NY
Waterville, ME
Lancaster, PA
Lewisburg, PA

38
27
13
12
47
32

Private not-forprofit 4-yr
institution
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

Based on these nonfinancial criteria, Bates and F&M are arguably Union’s closest peers.
2.2 Union Compared to Peers with Moody’s Methodology
Exhibit 11 summarizes the findings for peer institutions compared to Union. Using
FY2016 financial statements, the most recent available, and applying the same scorecard
methodology as before, Exhibit 11 shows the preliminary outcomes for Union’s peer group.
Exhibit 11: Peer School Analysis According to Moody’s Scorecard
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Interestingly, both Hamilton and Bucknell, currently rated Aa2 come out with preliminary
overall scores in the A1 category, with scores of 5.0 and 5.1 respectively. This is two-notches
below their current ratings. Colby, also rated Aa2 currently, scored an aggregate of 4.5 putting it
in the Aa3 category, one-notch below its current rating. Bates’ overall score of 7.3 was the worst
in the group, putting it one-notch below its current A1 rating with a preliminary rating of A3.
F&M also came out with a preliminary rating of A1, consistent with its current rating.
2.3 Potential Explanations for Inconsistencies
After looking at the Moody’s scorecard analysis for Union and its peer group the
following question emerged. Are Union, Bates, and F&M rated lower than they should be? Or
are Hamilton, Colby, and Bucknell rated more highly than they should be? The current ratings
were calculated using Moody’s old higher education rated methodology. As mentioned before,
Moody’s prior rating methodology relied more heavily on aspects related to student demand,
things like retention and matriculation (which have since been eliminated). These are also things
that U.S. News and World Report use for their rankings. I looked up the top ten liberal arts
schools according to U.S. News and World Report and found their Moody’s ratings. All of these
schools were in the highest investment grade category, Aaa. My suspicion is that Moody’s
adjusted Colby and Bates, ranked 12 and 13 respectively, for their strong reputation and strong
demand. This would explain why for example, their poor revenue diversity it overlooked,
because when the school is in high demand it does not matter as much that revenues are not
diverse.
The most surprising outcome in the peer group were that Hamilton and Bucknell arrived
at preliminary scores equivalent to two-notches below their current ratings. Both colleges scored
poorly in the reputation and pricing power and revenue diversity factors. Since reputation and
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pricing power is measured by annual change in operating revenue this could simply reflect that
Bucknell and Hamilton experienced little growth in operating revenue, however, if their
operating revenues were already substantial enough to cover operating expenses easily this is not
a major concern. This is one instance where Moody’s would likely look at annual trends and
make adjustments as they see fit to more accurately represent Hamilton and Bucknell’s financial
position.
Other factors may be adjusted or weighted more that Hamilton and Bucknell score well
in. As Moody’s states in their methodology they, “in some circumstances, the importance of one
factor may exceed its prescribed weight in this methodology” (Kedem pg. 5). Potential factors
that could be weighted more heavily include strategic positioning, liquidity, and financial
leverage.
Additionally, it should be kept in mind that Moody’s states almost all preliminary
outcomes are within two-notches of the final rating. Thus, since all of these preliminary scores
are within two-notches it is reasonable to conclude that these preliminary outcomes could be
very similar to what Moody’s analysts calculate.
2.4 Union’s Strengths Relative to Peer Institutions
Before delving into Union’s strengths compared to peer colleges, it is useful to visualize
how close Union is its peer currently rated Aa2: Bucknell, Colby, and Hamilton. Exhibit 12
shows the ten factors from Moody’s scorecard on each of the axes. The more robust a circle, the
better the college scored overall. As explained previously, a score of 1 in any factor is the best
possible score and a score of 20 is the worst.
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Exhibit 12: Union (A1) V. Peers Currently Rated (Aa2)

Union (A1) V. Peers Currently Rated (Aa2)
Hamilton: Currently (Aa2)

Bucknell: Currently (Aa2)

Colby: Currently (Aa2)

Union: Currently (A1)

Debt afforability

Financial Leverage

Scope of operations
1
6
11

Reputation and Pricing
Power
Strategic Positioning

16

liquidity

Operating Results

Operating Reserve

Revenue diversity
Total wealth

In Exhibit 12 we see that the maroon line representing Union’s score overlaps with the
other lines a considerable amount, and at some points Union’s line lies on the outside of the other
schools showing that Union outperforms in some categories. Although this graph does not take
the weights of each factor into account, it still shows the closeness of the preliminary scores.
Union is on par with or outperforms more highly rated peer institutions in five factors:
scope of operations, reputation and pricing power, operating results, operating reserve, and debt
affordability. Scope of operations, measured by operating revenue is scored as the same
alphanumerical outcome for all the colleges, A. The A score for this factor ranges from operating
revenues between $75,000,000 and $400,000,000. Since the range is so large all the colleges are
securely in this category because of their similar tuition base and student body size. Reputation
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and pricing power, measured by annual change in operating revenue is one of Union’s strongest
categories as discussed previously. The high change in operating revenue due to increases in
private gifts makes Union stand out compared to peers that experienced little growth in revenues.
Operating results, measured by operating cash flow margin, demonstrates Union’s ability
to meet budgetary needs. Union’s score of 26.8% far exceeds the next highest ratio of 15.8%.
Union’s ratio is so strong because of Union’s strong operating income. Peer colleges have low,
or even negative operating income, which means endowment spending or other funds must be
used to cover the imbalance. Union, however, covers its annual expenses more easily in
comparison to peers. Additionally, Union’s operating reserve factor, measured by spendable cash
and investments to operating income is also strong. This factors helps show whether an
institution can handle times of financial stress. Finally, Union’s debt affordability, even with the
addition of $50 million of additional debt is still good at 5.0 times. This is largely driven by the
fact that peer institutions like Hamilton and Colby have taken on far more debt than Union;
Union currently has $116 million outstanding, while Hamilton and Colby have more than $220
million. This comparison supports that Union is considered a more cautious borrower than other
colleges. Thus, Union’s strengths relative to its peers is driven by their strong and increasing
operating revenue and relatively low debt outstanding.
2.5 Union’s Areas of Weakness Relative to Peers
Peer colleges rated more highly outperform relative to Union in four factors: liquidity,
financial leverage, total wealth, and potentially strategic positioning. As mentioned previously,
Union’s liquidity is strong at 594 days, putting it in the Aa alphanumerical range for this factor.
Peers, however, have even better liquidity than Union, but this is not a concern.
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Financial leverage, measured by spendable cash and investments to total debt, and total
wealth, measured by total cash and investments, are clearly tied to one another, both take into
account cash and investments. This is where Union’s smaller endowment is reflected in the
scorecard. Union’s endowment, which was valued at $432 million in FY16 is about half the size
of Hamilton, Bucknell, and Colby’s endowments at $883 million, $817 million, and $925 million
respectively. The magnitude of Union’s endowment in relation to peer colleges is Union’s
biggest concern financially. There is an industry expectation that colleges will only draw on the
endowment incrementally year over year. Thus, if there was a problem with Union’s finances
and they had to use the endowment to cover its debt service, much of the endowment would be
depleted. This raises concerns for rating agencies. This concern is exacerbated because Union’s
endowment return was about -9.0% and cited by Bloomberg as the worst endowment return
among the “little Ivies” (McDonald, Smith 2016).
2.6 Recommendations for Union’s Credit Story and Positioning Union’s Weaknesses
Union faces two main issues in terms of its credit rating: explaining its weakest factor,
revenue diversity and justifying a score of “very good” for strategic positioning. Union can draw
on peer comparison to strengthen its credit story and point to Moody’s methodology for support.
For example, Moody’s states, “Within a broad revenue category, there may be significant
diversity that helps mitigate risks. Examples include programmatic and geographic diversity of
the student body for tuition charges” (Kedem 2015 p 9). Although Union’s preliminary
alphanumerical score for revenue diversity is Baa because roughly 70% of revenues are secured
through one revenue stream, student tuition and fees, this revenue stream is diverse in itself.
Using this logic from Moody’s own methodology, Union can argue the “broad revenue category”
of student tuition and fees should be reevaluated because of Union’s strong programmatic and

30

geographic diversity. This is also a good opportunity to discuss Union’s strong engineering
program, which sets Union apart from peer institutions and will be significantly strengthened by
the S&E project.
Programmatic and geographic diversity at Union is strong. According to Union’s most
recent common data set reporting 68% of students come are out-of-state and 11% of students are
international. This helps protect Union’s revenues if there was decreased demand say in the
northeast or even the U.S., Union could draw on its interest across the country and abroad to
maintain its revenues.
Coupled with Union’s strong geographic diversity is robust programmatic diversity.
Union offers more than 40 majors to students with the option to combine majors in an
interdepartmental major (union.edu 2017). According to the most current common data set
report, 13% of students graduated with degrees in engineering. Union offers four different
engineering majors, one of the primary distinctions between Union and peer colleges. Of the five
peers identified, only Bucknell had an engineering program. This shows not only that Union sets
itself apart programmatically compared to peers, but also explains the need to invest in the
building of the new S&E project.
Union’s largest program of study is social sciences with 30% of the total degrees
conferred. However, it should be noted that the weight of this category is overstated because
social sciences encompass multiple majors and areas of study. Therefore, Union is able to attract
students interested in a variety of programs, which further protects its student tuition and fees
revenue stream. Union should aim to highlight the unique combination it offers as a liberal arts
school with a strong engineering program. This is the essence of Union’s mission to encourage a
breadth of education. Exhibit 13 summarizes Union’s programmatic and geographic diversity.
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Exhibit 13: Union’s Programmatic and Geographic Diversity

Union's Programmatic Diversity by Area of Study

Gender Studies
Engineering
English
Biological Sciences
Theology

Computer and Information Sciences
Foreign Languages
Liberal Arts
Mathematics
Physical Sciences

Additionally, despite a score of Baa in this factor category, it is still the best among its peers (see
Exhibit 9). Thus, this is a category that typically every college struggles with considering the
other means of generating revenue are so incremental.
Through successful strategic planning, however, Union improved in this category over
the years. Union decreased student tuition and fees as a percentage of total revenue from roughly
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82% in FY13 to 70% in FY16. This decrease is largely attributed to increasing private gifts and
grants since FY11. Exhibit 11 shows the growth of private gifts and grants from FY11 to FY16
in thousands of dollars.
Exhibit 11: Union’s Private Gifts and Grants FY11 to FY16 ($000)
Union's Private Gifts and Grants FY2011 to FY2016 ($000)
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
FY2011

FY2012

FY2013

FY2014

FY2015

FY2016

0

Union’s private gifts and grants increased 236% since FY11, and private gifts and grants as a
percentage of total revenue increased from 9% to 22% over the same period. This is a direct
result of Union’s ability to identify revenue diversification as an area of concern and target the
problem systematically by increasing growth in a different revenue stream. President Ainlay led
a strategic plan to increase gifts through grass root campaigns like, “A day 4 U”, social media
challenges, and new approaches to “generation U” giving (alumni of the past decade) (union.edu
2017). The success of these campaigns affirm that the growth will be sustained in the future and
do not show just a one-time increase in private gifts and grants. Moody’s specifically states,
“Integral to determining strategic priorities is a university’s ability to identify strengths and
weakness relative to key competitors and to track progress against established goals (Kedem
2015 p 7). Thus, explaining Union’s plan to target its revenue diversity weakness, and its
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success in doing so could also contribute to its goal of achieving an outcome of, “very good” for
strategic planning.
Union should also be prepared to discuss its strategic plan more broadly. Specifically,
Union should be prepared to discuss its negative endowment return and the plans to generate
positive returns in the future. For example, although the year over year endowment return is
negative, looking at different time horizons may show less drastic negative returns (Blake 2017).
Union can also explain how aiming to increase private gifts are grants is helping to slowly
increase Union’s endowment base, thus growing its potential. After discussing with Union’s
Vice President of Finance, Diane Blake, she expressed that the board did indeed have plans to
change the way they choose to invest the endowment. Currently, members of the board make
endowment decisions, but that may no longer be the case in the future. Union should overview
these plans with the Moody’s to assure the rating agency that Union is capable of handling the
situation.
I recommend also discussing positive aspects and trends in terms of applications,
retention rates, and graduation rates to show that Union is attracting many future students and
when students come to Union they generally have a good experience. Since academic year
2011-2012 Union largely maintained its selectivity and matriculation percentages. Currently
Union’s selectivity according to the most recent common data reporting is at 38%, while
matriculation is at 25%. Union’s graduation rates are also high over the same time period ranging
from 86% to 93%. Union’s retention rates are on par with its peers. Exhibit 14 shows retention
rates for Union, Bates, F&M, Bucknell, and Hamilton from academic years 2011-2012 to 20152016.
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Exhibit 14: Retention Rates Academic Years 2011-2012 to 2015-2016
Retention Rates Academic Years 2011 -2012 to 2015-2016
0.98
0.96
0.94
0.92
0.9
0.88
0.86
11 - 12
Union

12 - 13
Bates

13 - 14

14 - 15

F&M

Bucknell

15 - 16
Hamilton

Although Union’s retention rates fell about four percentage points from 2012-2013 to 20142015, retention rates as of 2015-2016 converged with peers at around 93%. This is one indication
that Union students are largely satisfied with their decision to attend the college. Additionally,
Union’s overall increase in applications since academic year 2011-2012 was 16.4%. Over the
same period Bates and Hamilton saw 8.8% and -0.66 percent growth respectively. F&M and
Bucknell’s applications increased more than Union’s over the same period, with 39.9% and
26.5% increases respectively. However, Union’s increase of 16.4% is still impressive,
demonstrating an increased demand to attend Union.
In addition to mitigating Union’s two weakest points, Union should use its strengths
relative to its peer group to strengthen its credit. Strengths, discussed in section 2.4, should be
highlighted to Moody’s and tied into its overall credit story. The peer comparison helps put
Union’s increasing revenues, Union’s cautious borrowing, and ability to combat times of
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financial stress into perspective. These strengths help reinforce Union’s main points that it is a
fiscally responsible institution and that the S&E building project is a well thought out endeavor.
After this portion of the presentation, I recommend tying the discussion together, talking
about how S&E building project fits in with this overall plan. I recommend discussing how the
building project positively affects Union’s competitive advantage in engineering with liberal arts,
how the S&E building could inadvertently contribute to increased applications and better
matriculation, and how updating this building will draw more support from alumni who have
expressed that the building needs to be updated will better Union’s credit. This explanation of
Union’s strategic position and its overall vision for the S&E building will hopefully help Union
secure a score of “very good” or better for strategic positioning, and an overall rating of A1.
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Chapter 3: Union College Debt Structure Considerations
3.1 Identifying a Framework for Debt Structuring
There are many things to consider and many decisions to make when issuing debt. First,
issuers must take preexisting debt into account. For example, let’s imagine a college, let’s call it
Blue College, that has the following debt to be paid over the upcoming years. Exhibit 15 shows
how much debt must be repaid over the next ten years for the fictional Blue College.
Exhibit 15: Blue College’s Current Debt Service

Year 1

$10 Million

Year 2

$10 Million

Year 3

$10 Million

Year 4

$10 Million

Year 5

$5 Million

Year 6

$5 Million

Year 7

$5 Million

Year 8

$5 Million

Year 9

$5 Million

Year 10

$5 Million

In total, Blue College currently has $70 million of debt outstanding. If they decided to build a
new dorm and need to issue an additional $30 million of new money debt they have a few
options. Blue College could level its debt service payments and issue $5 million of debt in years
5 to 10. Let’s call this option 1. Alternatively, Blue College could issue a mixture of short-term
(debt in years 1-5) and some long-term debt. We will call this option 2. Or, Blue College could

37

push the debt out further, extending the time horizon of the debt structure, issuing $5 million in
years 11-16. We will call this option 3. There are pros and costs to each option.
Option 1, or leveling the debt so that $10 million must be paid each year, is the most
sustainable from a financial perspective, meaning the debt service is roughly the same year after
year. Sustainability of debt service is an advantage because it is predictable and arguably easier
to budget for (Denison, Fowles, Moody 2014). This structure, however, concentrates the debt to
be repaid unnecessarily over only a ten-year period. The concentration of debt is the main
drawback to option 1.
Option 2, or mixing short-term and long-term debt, is the most balanced. Since different
types of investors (separately managed accounts, insurance agencies, individuals, hedge funds
etc.) look to diversify their portfolios and are attracted to different aspects of a bond, it is
important to spread debt across the curve to ensure there will be investor demand to buy the debt
(Guibaud, Nosbush, Vayanos 2013).
Option 3, or extending the debt, will help maintain the current debt structure, and simply
push the debt service out further into the future. This is a positive on the one hand because Blue
College likely already budgeted for the current debt structure, and thus this budgeting will not be
disturbed. On the other hand, extending all the debt to long-term debt means higher interest rate
cost and more interest rate payments increases risk because the longer-term debt is perceived as
more-risky. Furthermore, this is also taking a bet that long-term interest rates will not go any
lower than they are at the time of the bond sale (Kancuzk, Alfaro 2009). Market conditions must
be evaluated to predict trends on interest rates.
Although these three scenarios are fictitious, they demonstrate an important conceptual
framework that applies to Union’s actual debt issue. From the three scenarios, we learn that there
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are a few things to keep in mind when structuring the new debt: sustainability of the debt service
given financial constraints, an absence of concentration of the debt in any year or group of years,
balance between short-term and long-term debt, and market conditions. In addition to these four
main considerations, there are other aspects of the type of bonds to issue: variable rate or fixed
rate, callable or non-callable, and series or term bond1. Since rating agencies typically view
variable rate debt as more-risky, and Union’s finance team has expressed that they wish to only
offer fixed rate debt (Blake 2017). Thus, the structures will all assume fixed rate.
3.2 Union’s Current Debt Service
Union currently has debt from four series of bonds outstanding: Series 1999, Series 2006,
Series 2008, and Series 2012. Exhibit 16 shows how much principal will be due in each year out
to 2037, the last year Union currently has principal due. Each color represents a different series
of bonds. We can see that there are considerable spikes in the years 2029, 2031, 2032, and 2037.
These spikes are term bonds. All of the term bonds Union issued except for the 2037 term bond
from series 2009, however, are subject to mandatory sinking fund redemption. Mandatory
sinking fund redemption requires the issuer to regularly redeem a fixed portion of some or all of
the bonds according to a fixed schedule. Therefore, although these spikes caused by the term
bonds appear to be a looming issue they are not in reality. For example, according to page 10 of
Union’s Series 2006 official statement the 2031 term bond is subject to its first mandatory
sinking fund payment of $2.5 million on July 1st, 2027 (EMMA 2017). There are three more
mandatory sinking fund payments in 2028, 2029, and 2030 of similar slightly varying sizes.
Exhibit 16 shows Union’s debt service as issued without the mandatory sinking fund schedule.

1

A series bond is a classic bond that pays interest payments (usually semiannually) until the
principal is due. A term bond is structured so that all of the interest and principal comes due at
maturity.
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Exhibit 17 shows Union’s debt service taking the mandatory sinking fund schedules of the bonds
into account.

Exhibit 16: Union’s Current Debt Service in $000

Current Debt Service $000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0

Series 1999

Series 2006

Series 2008

Series 2012

Exhibit 17: Union’s Current Debt Service in $000 taking the Mandatory Sinking Fund
Schedule into Account
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Since the sinking fund payments are mandatory, the relevant debt service structure is not the
structure that was issued displayed in Exhibit 1, but rather the structure shown in Exhibit 17. The
goal now is to find a logical way to add an additional $50 million of debt on top of and around
the existing maturities shown in Exhibit 17. As in the example with Blue College, there will be
pros and cons to each debt structure scenario. Union should consider the balance between longterm and short-term debt, deft affordability in terms of sustainability of debt, and a lack of
concentration of the debt and current market conditions.
After discussing with Union’s finance department, they expressed that $10 million of
short term-debt is the maximum amount they could issue. Additionally, Union’s underwriter
advised that there would not be demand for short-term debt in excess of $10 million (Kabalian
2017). Thus, the decision to place ten million of short-term debt in potential structures was not
entirely arbitrary, but rather a reflection of prior analysis. Issuing $10 million of short-term debt
also aligns with Union’s pledge payment schedule. Union could effectively offset all of the
short-term principal payments with pledges. Union’s finance department also made it clear that
all the debt would be tax-exempt and all the debt would be fixed rate (Blake, Kabalian 2017).
Thus, it should be assumed that any potential debt structures are assumed fixed rate debt issued
in denominations of at least $5,000 (the bare minimum for a maturity).
3.3 Potential Debt Structures for Union’s $50 Million of Additional Debt
I propose three distinct debt structures for Union’s additional $50 million of new money
debt. In order to maximize the long-term to short-term debt balance the maximum $10 million of
short-term debt is structured into all three scenarios (Kabalian 2017). The first option is the level
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debt structure option, the second option is the “staircase” structure option, and the third option is
the term bond option. Exhibits 18, 19, and 20 below display these three options in that order.

Exhibit 18: Option 1, Level Debt Service

Exhibit 19: Option 2, “Staircase” Debt Service
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Exhibit 20: Option 3, Term Bond

Options one, two, and three are exactly the same from maturities 2017 through 2029.
Therefore, they all issue the maximum $10 million of short-term debt. The differences in the
debt structuring options come after the year 2029. In the first option, the level option, all the
principal maturities are structured to be about the same as height as the principal due in 2029. In
the second option, the “staircase” option, the debt increases gradually after 2029 with $28.8
million of new debt issue between 2029 and 2037. Finally, in the term bond option, there is only
$13.1 million of new debt issued between 2029 and 2037 and a term bond issued thirty years out
to 2047. Each option has distinct pros and cons.
At a glance, option one, the level option, may seem like the best option in terms of
avoiding debt concentration. All of the debt is paid off by 2038, and roughly the same amount of
principal is due each year. If we look back to the original debt structure, however, we can see in
Exhibit 17 that the current debt service has a staircase like pattern. This is because although the
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debt service looks like its increasing, when interest payments are taken into account the debt
service is actually more level. In the foremost years Union must pay interest on all the
outstanding bonds as well as the principal amount due in any given year. Thus, as the years go on
the principal should increase, because the number of interest payments are decreasing. Option
one would only be level in the extreme and impossible case of zero percent interest rates on all
the maturities of the new debt. This is why the second option, the “staircase” option is better than
the first in terms of avoiding a concentration of debt. Although the principle due is increasing in
option two, the debt service (principle due and interest) will actually be more level. How level
the debt service actually is depends on the achieved interest rate and yields during pricing. The
higher the interest rates, the higher the interest rate payments will be, and the more dramatic the
staircase structure must be to accommodate the payments to make the debt service more level.
More level debt payments are easier to plan for from a budgetary perspective, and are therefore
more fiscally sustainable because roughly the same amount will be set aside year after year.
However, Union should assess whether debt structure option two achieves the best
sustainability because of how high the average principal payments are. Structure two adds a
heavy debt burden for the next twenty years with $28.8 million in principal due between 2029
and 2037. The average amount of principal due over the next twenty years would be $5.8 million
annually. Option two, however, could be relatively expensive since over $20 million of the debt
is longer term. Classically, longer maturities result in higher interest rate costs and higher yields.
In the next section, section 3.4, two recent college debt issues will be discussed as well as current
interest rate considerations help get a sense for how expensive longer term debt will be.
Option three combines the “staircase” idea from option two and removes the heavy debt
burden from 2029 to 2037 by issuing a long-term term bond due in 2047. As opposed to issuing
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$28.8 million between years 2029 and 2037 as option two does, option three only issues $13.3
million over this same period. In Exhibit 20 we can see that option three makes use of a staircase
structure leading up to 2029, and then there is an additional lower staircase from 2029 to 2037.
Lowering the debt service in these mid-years and still maintaining the staircase structure up to
2029 offers the distinct advantage of increasing flexibility for future issues. For example, if
Union chooses to issue more debt say five or ten years from now, Union still has the ability to
add additional principal to years 2030 on without disrupting Union’s budgetary confinements.
Lowering the principal between these years also lowers average principal payments from $5.8
million a year over the next twenty years in option two, to a more manageable $3.8 million a
year over thirty years. By extending the farthest maturity to the maximum maturity of thirty
years, the debt service from a principal standpoint becomes more manageable. Additionally, by
issuing, a term bond in 2047 Union does not have to account for interest payments on $15.6
million of long-term debt until the term bond or sinking fund payments come due. Conversely,
since term bonds are an additional risk for investors, the interest rate on the bond could be
higher.
I recommend making the 2047 term bond subject to mandatory sinking fund payments.
Union used this tactic in the past to mitigate the spike in principal due in any year, thus avoiding
a concentration of debt. Sinking fund payments reassure Union the term bond is not a budgetary
issue in the future, but the college can steal reap the benefits of not paying the interest on the
term bond now.
There are infinite ways to structure Union’s additional debt. While these three options
only represent three structuring scenarios, I think option three, or a structure that uses the same
principal ideas, is the best option given Union’s current debt structure for the following reasons:
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1. Although there could be a higher interest rate on the 2047 term bond, it will lessen the
average debt service over the next 30 years by roughly $2 million in principal annually
and have additional benefits in terms of lessened interest payments upfront.
2. Breaking the term bond into mandatory sinking fund payments will mitigate the
concern of the 2047 principal spike.
3. Option three still issues the maximum amount of short-term debt, which assures that
Union will take advantage of the lower interest rates on the short end of the yield curve
and can offset these principal payments with pledges.
4. Option three lowers the debt service between the years 2029 and 2037 by roughly
$15.5 million giving Union increased flexibility for future issues.
Therefore, option three achieves the best balance possible between short-term and longterm debt, lowers the concentration of debt by issuing less principal in the mid-term years, makes
the debt service more sustainable by lowering the average amount of principal due over the next
thirty years, and lowers upcoming interest payments by issuing a large long-term term bond.
3.4 Recent College Debt Issues and Interest Rate Considerations
According to EMMA there were two recent debt issues for higher education issuers. The
most recent deal was for Iowa State University of Science and Technology. The deal was
complicated. It was issued in three separate parts with individual official statements; two
separate refundings, and a new money issue, all of which priced on March 1st. In total the deal
was a similar size to what Union will issue with a total between the three issues of $55.4 million.
However, each part of the deal had different debt ratings by different agencies and somewhat
bizarre interest rate schemes. The first deal matured between 2018 and 2042 but all the interest
rates were between 3.0% and 3.5%. The second deal matured from 2018 to 2028 and all the
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interest rates were 4.0% even. The final portion matured between 2017 and 2034 and all the
interest rates were 5.0%. A deal this complex seems atypical and the interest rates are abnormal.
Aside from the size of the deal, the Iowa University issue has little in common with Union’s
future issue.
Haverford College, however, also issued new debt recently. Haverford College is a top
rated private liberal arts college just outside of Philadelphia. On February 28th Haverford issued
$98.3 million of debt rated AA- by Fitch and S&P. These ratings are considered the equivalent of
Aa3 rating by Moody’s standards, one notch above where Union will tentatively will be rated.
Although Haverford’s deal was large, about $40 million of the deal was new money while the
rest was a refunding of prior debt. Thus, although this deal in sum is about twice the size of
Union’s, the new money portion of the deal is roughly similar to Union’s. Additionally, since
Haverford is also a small liberal arts college in the Northeast and the credit is rated similarly to
Union, the deal could offer useful insight. Exhibit 21 below shows the maturities, coupons, and
yields for Haverford’s Series 2017A issue.
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Exhibit 21: Haverford’s Series 2017A Deal

Haverford issued serial maturities from 2017 to 2037 and three term bonds, one in 2042 and two
in 2046. Haverford issued only $5.2 million of short-term debt and three large long-term term
bonds, which in total accounted for roughly half the debt issue. We can see that the amount
issued increases as the maturities go further out into longer-term debt, showing the staircase idea
implemented.
The asterisks next to the yields indicate that a bond is callable. Therefore the maturities
from 2027 to 2037 are callable, as are the 2042 and one of the 2046 term bonds. However, there
are two 2037 maturities and one is not callable. The term 2042 term bond and the 2037 serial
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bond that are not callable have lower interest rates than the callable bonds because the investors
do not need to be compensated for the possibility the bond could be called prior to maturity.
Overall, the interest rates are relatively straightforward. 2017 has an interest rate of 3.0%, 2018
with 4.0%, and almost all the other maturities have interest rates of 5.0%. (The 2036 maturity
with a lower interest rate was likely created specifically to meet an investor’s demand that
wanted a higher yield as opposed to more interest.) While in theory we would expect to see the
interest rates gradually increase as the bonds become longer-term, this theory does not always
hold in practice. Although interest rates do not increase as we would expect, the yields do follow
a classic pattern: as the maturities become longer the yields are generally higher.
Long-term interest rates have reached all-time historical lows in the past twelve months
and the yield curve has become increasingly flattened. This is why in the Haverford deal, and
generally, interest rates are relatively similar across the curve. Exhibit 22 shows U.S. Treasuries
for 1-yr, 10-yr, and 30-yr maturities since 2000 (FRED 2017).

Exhibit 22: 1-Yr, 10-Yr, and 30-Yr U.S. Treasuries Since 2000
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From Exhibit 22 it is apparent that interest rates have fallen considerably since 2000 when all of
the rates were between 6% and 7%. Since the great recession in 2008, interest rates have
converged and stayed low, primarily attributed to actions taken by the Federal Reserve.
Currently, we can see that short-term interest rates have ticked up slightly and are no longer near
zero, but are still below 1%, and long-term interest rates are still historically low. Exhibit 22
supports why Haverford structured about 50% of their debt as long-term term bonds and pushed
a large majority of the debt into the mid and long-term years. We can see in Exhibit 21 that
Haverford will pay the same interest rate on a 30-year term bond as they will on a three-year
serial bond, thus it made sense for Haverford to issue a majority of the debt long-term since there
was no additional cost from an interest rate standpoint. Issuing large term bonds will also help
Haverford keep their debt payments in the forefront years lower.
I feel Haverford’s Series 2017A deal further supports that Union should consider
structuring their debt based on option 3. Haverford’s deal shows how issuing large long-term
term bonds accomplishes lower up-front costs and could potentially impact interest rate costs
minimally because of current market conditions.
3.5 Summary of the Project and How S&E fits in with Union’s Strategic Plan
Union states in its strategic plan that its primary goal is to, “Further Union's mission as a
scholarly community that educates students to be engaged, innovative and ethical contributors to
an increasingly diverse, global and technologically complex society” (Union.edu 2017) The
building of the new Science and Engineering building is well aligned with this vision. President
Ainlay called the project, “the largest, most expensive, most complex project in Union’s history”
(Ainlay 2017). However, this capital project is not just an expensive undertaking, but rather an
expansion of Union’s reach to future students and a manifestation of its mission. This year Union
was named one of the top five schools for women in STEM by U.S.A Today College Guide
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(Bouluc 2017). The building will be a combined renovation and rebuild resulting in the
reinvigoration of the STEM areas. New science facilities will not only help Union maintain this
position, but potentially help Union meet other strategic goals like attracting more women to the
school who want to study STEM programs. The S&E building is a wise capital investment
because it will continue Union’s standing as a top Engineering liberal arts college and help
attract a diverse student body interested in the latest advancements in science and technology.
Union is well positioned to secure an A1 rating for the debt under Moody’s new Global
Higher Education Rating methodology. After reviewing Union’s most recent and past financials,
Union has the ability to take on more debt while still maintaining good leverage and debt
affordability ratios. By comparing the college to peer institutions Union will be able to enhance
their strongest criteria, while defending their weakest metric, revenue diversity. A discussion of
how this project will reinvigorate Union’s STEM areas of study and help better its competitive
edge in the field of engineering will speak to Union’s strong strategic positioning.
Assuming Union will achieve an investment grade rating from Moody’s, there are many
options in terms of structuring the additional debt. Based on the historically low interest rates and
the pricing of the recent Haverford deal, Union should capitalize on the market conditions by
issuing a large long-term term bond to lower upfront costs. By issuing $10 million of short-term
debt Union will be able to pay off a fifth of the principal within five years through pledged
donations for the project.
President Ainlay ended his public announcement of the project stating, “Union will be the
college of choice for physicists who want to dance, or chemists who want to double major in art”
(Ainlay 2017). This capital project has the ability to further Union’s legacy and help Union
achieve its goal of being the college of choice for interdisciplinary studies for students around
the globe and to be completed with relatively little disturbance financially.
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Appendix A: Financial and Common Data Set Information for Union and Peers
This appendix shows the numbers and ratios used to calculate the alphanumerical scores
for to arrive at calculated preliminary ratings for Union and its peers. The first sheets are Union’s
full financials from FY211 to FY16. The source is the Electronic Municipal Market Access
website (EMMA), where all municipal issuers are required to post continuing disclosure
information including annual financial statements. The next sheets are condensed financial
information from FY14 to FY16 for Union’s peers. Information was also gathered from EMMA.
Following this, there is information from Union and peer colleges’ common data set reports.
Finally, is Moody’s rubric for assigning strategic positioning scores from its 2015 Global Higher
Education Rating Methodology.
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Balance Sheet

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

3.661

22.912

27.137

20.225

26.776

21.908

Pledges receivable, net

38.756

17.691

12.606

16.007

15.106

12.942

Notes and accounts receivable, net

10.044

10.689

8.920

9.381

9.686

9.741

Deposits with bond trustees

3.247

4.525

4.862

4.275

2.753

2.849

Other assets

3.891

4.165

4.839

5.465

5.724

11.429

Investments

428.128

480.775

455.111

362.123

319.523

340.224

79

3.000

1.184

2.505

12.678

Assets
Cash and Cash equivalents

Receivable for investments sold
Beneﬁcial interst in irrevocable trusts

5.153

5.419

5.519

5.062

6.433

Land, builds, and equipment, net

185.777

163.089

146.640

146.988

145.727

143.817

Total Assets

678.738

712.266

666.818

572.031

544.406

542.912

Liabili9es and net Assets
Liabili9es
Accounts payable and accrued expenes

14.096

13.316

13.034

11.780

10.582

10.154

constructuPon costs payable

1.730

5.325

700

461

676

828

deposits and advances

2.397

2.023

1.998

1.647

1.386

1.296

pooled life income and charitable giQ annuiPPes payable

4.429

4.545

4.632

4.781

5.251

69.603

asset rePrement obligaPons

1.387

1.488

1.478

1.638

1.664

5.354

refundable federal student loan funds

2.357

2.372

2.401

2.461

2.474

1.664
2.512

accrued postrePrement beneﬁts

13.271

12.072

10.607

10.459

11.604

Long-term Debt

116.868

120.366

112.636

74.049

75.159

9.604

Total Liabili9es

156.535

161.508

147.486

107.276

108.796

101.014

Unrestricted

194.997

216.019

205.245

190.376

180.671

186.681

TemporaPly restricted

159.327

170.041

157.548

122.610

109.693

115.499

Permanently restricted

167.880

164.698

156.539

151.769

145.244

139.717

Total net assets

522.203

550.758

519.332

464.755

435.609

441.897

total liabi9es and net assets

678.738

712.266

666.818

572.031

544.406

542.912

TuiPon and fees

109.850

105.943

102.573

97.821

93.802

89.700

Room and Board

24.501

23.321

22.195

21.815

21.137

19.277

Less student aid

Net Assets

Income Statement
Opera9ng Ac9vi9es

(43.857)

(41.646)

(40.778)

(39.839)

(37.913)

(36.571)

Net tuPPon fees, room and board

90.494

87.618

83.990

79.796

77.026

72.406

Investment return

20.484

18.809

17.870

16.585

17.062

19.704

Government grants

3.047

2.092

2.860

2.920

2.935

3.323

Private giQs and grants

34.877

20.015

11.167

11.941

11.805

10.382

Intercollegiate athlePcs and other sources

4.996

3.580

2.288

2.586

3.573

4.112

Auxiliaries enterprises

3.624

3.865

4.517

4.384

4.452

5.057

157.521

135.980

122.691

118.211

116.853

114.984

net assets released from restricPons
Total revenue and reclassiﬁcaPons
Expenses

InstrucPnal and departmental research
sponsored research programs
academic support
student services

47.434

46.819

44.550

43.083

41.426

40.489

1.628

980

1.246

1.746

914

1.035

11.952

11.120

10.332

9.670

8.249

9.174

8.890

8.775

8.458

7.967

7.871

7.812

insPtuPonal support

25.205

23.515

22.631

21.411

22.635

19.835

Auxiliaries operaPons

23.393

23.299

22.861

22.600

21.765

21.950

Intercollegiate athlePcs and other sources

10.870

11.586

11.421

10.828

11.589

10.131

129.373

126.092

121.500

117.304

114.449

110.425

28.149

9.887

1.191

907

2.405

4.559

Total Expenses
Increase in net assets from operaPng acPviPes
Endowment and other net Assets
Investment return

(40.270)

32.285

63.236

34.327

3.947

48.421

Endowment gains used to meet spending policy

(18.570)

(17.537)

(14.781)

(14.800)

(15.325)

(17.242)

8.347

3.688

Private giQs and grants

3.626

Other

(579)

Net assets released from restricPons
Increase in endowment and other net assets

5.175

6.926

5.817

(1.556)

(243)

1.786

(1.229)

21.538

53.386

28.239

(910)
(56.703)

513

(1.902)
(8.693)

Increase in net assets from operaPng acPviPes

(28.554)

31.426

54.577

29.146

Net assets at begininning of year

550.758

519.332

464.755

435.609

441.897

401.960

Net Assets at end of year

522.203

550.758

519.332

464.755

435.609

441.897

9.637

9.409

10.481

10.864

10.742

9.966

(17)

(39)

71

162

DepreciaPon
AmorPzaPon

(2)

Interest
Total debt

(96)

(6.289)

35.379
39.938

4.507

5.244

4.079

2.690

2.953

2.821

116.868

120.366

112.636

74.049

75.159

69.603

157.521,23

135.979,89

122.690,85

113.827,18

112.401,72

114.983,74

15,84

10,83

7,79

1,27

28.148,72

9.887,48

1.190,68

26,85

17,98

12,82

Ra9os
OperaPng Revenue
Annual Change in OperaPng Revnue
OperaPng Income
OperaPng Cash Flow Margin
Revenue Diversity
Total Cash and Investments
Spendable Cash and Investments to OperaPng Expenses

(3.476,94)
8,82

(2,25)
(2.047,00)
10,43

#DIV/0!
4.558,81
15,23

69,74

77,91

83,60

85,94

83,45

78,01

431.789,41

503.687,85

482.248,34

382.347,66

346.299,57

362.132,11

3,64

4,13

4,07

3,40

3,16

3,40

594,43

675,73

674,79

652,83

635,88

678,27

Spendable Cash and Investments to Total Debt

2,59

2,96

3,00

3,33

2,88

3,38

Total debt to Cash Flow

3,51

4,92

7,16

7,38

6,41

3,98

total debt to cas ﬂow with debt

5,01

spendable cash and investments to total debt

1,81

Monthly Days Cash on Hand

FY 2016
Hamilton
Net assets released from restric/ons
total revnue
133.834
total expenses
137.303
deprecia/on and amor/za/on
16.987
interest
2.990
tu//on and fees
94.784
cash and cash equivelents
21.464
investments
861.749
pledges recievable net
1.009
unrestricted net assets
249.027
permenantely restricted net assets
260.132
total debt
239.552
endowment 2015
856.067
endowment 2016
817.210
change in endowment
-5%
Ra3os
Opera/ng Revenue
133.834
Annual Change in Opera/ng Revnue
3,122953283
Opera/ng Income
(3.469)
Opera/ng Cash Flow Margin
12,33468326
Revenue Diversity
70,82206315
Total Cash and Investments
883.213
Spendable Cash and Investments to Opera/ng Expenses
6,439932121
Monthly Days Cash on Hand
755,47
Spendable Cash and Investments to Total Debt
2,605238111
Total debt to Cash Flow
14,51126726

Hamilton: Currently (Aa2)
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity

Outcome
A
Baa
Aaa
A
Baa
Aa
Aaa
Aaa
Aa
Baa
Score
6
9
1
6
9

FY 2015
129.781
134.423
15.842
3.435
93.261
25.316
919.578
1.244
256.100
238.509
244.133

129.781
1,566767622
(4.642)
11,27668919
71,86028772
944.894
7,038512755
788,29
2,898538911
16,68144858

Outcome
A
Ba
Aaa
A
Baa
Aa
Aaa
Aaa
Aa
Baa
Score
6
12
1
6
9

FY 2014
127.779
129.223
14.573
3.291
90.346
28.126
927.520
1.209
230.615
237.835
248.021

127.779
(1.444)
12,85031187
70,70488891
955.646
7,404680281
734,186437
2,899028711
15,10481121

Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Total Score
Preliminary Outcome

3
3
1
1
1
1
3
3
9
9
Weight
Weight
15%
15%
5%
5%
10%
10%
10%
10%
15%
15%
10%
10%
10%
10%
5%
5%
10%
10%
10%
10%
Weighted ScoreWeighted Score
0,9
0,9
0,45
0,6
0,1
0,1
0,6
0,6
1,35
1,35
0,3
0,3
0,1
0,1
0,05
0,05
0,3
0,3
0,9
0,9
5,05
5,2
A1
A1

FY 2016
Franklin and Marshall
Net assets released from restric/ons
total revnue
139.412
total expenses
136.203
deprecia/on
14.292
interest
4.384
tu//on and fees
117.336
cash and cash equivelents
12.605
investments
356.178
pledges recievable net
33.387
unrestricted net assets
246.049
permenantely restricted net assets
124.841
total debt
99.442
endowment 2015
302.587
endowment 2016
275.807
change in endowment
-9%
Ra3os
Opera/ng Revenue
139.412
Annual Change in Opera/ng Revnue
2,054082544
Opera/ng Income
3.209
Opera/ng Cash Flow Margin
15,69807477
Revenue Diversity
84,16492124
Total Cash and Investments
368.783
Spendable Cash and Investments to Opera/ng Expenses
2,952724977
Monthly Days Cash on Hand
736,67
Spendable Cash and Investments to Total Debt
2,788851793
Total debt to Cash Flow
4,543842815

Franklin and Marshall: Currently (A1)
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity

Outcome
A
Baa
Aa
Aa
Ba
A
Aa
Aaa
Aa
Aa
Score
6
9
3
3
12

FY 2015
136.606
126.449
8.123
4.023
113.126
4.123
393.571
8.363
268.037
117.847
79.108

FY 2014
126961
122.920
8.036
4.130
110.559
2.158
408.117
6.565
280.616
111.526
142.960

136.606
7,596821071
10.157
16,32651567
82,81188235
397.694
3,211231406
826,81
3,643247206
3,546966776

126.961
#DIV/0!
4.041
12,76533739
87,08107214
410.275
3,391148715
891,5500853
2,135660325
8,820879867

Outcome
A
Aa
Aa
Aa
Ba
A
Aa
Aaa
Aa
Aa
Score
6
3
3
3
12

Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Total Score
Preliminary Outcome

6
6
3
3
1
1
3
3
3
3
Weight
Weight
15%
15%
5%
5%
10%
10%
10%
10%
15%
15%
10%
10%
10%
10%
5%
5%
10%
10%
10%
10%
Weighted ScoreWeighted Score
0,9
0,9
0,45
0,15
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,3
1,8
1,8
0,6
0,6
0,3
0,3
0,05
0,05
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,3
5,3
5
A1
A1

FY 2016
Bucknell Unversity
Net assets released from restric/ons
total revnue
222.481
total expenses
219.237
deprecia/on
18.462
interest
5.625
tu//on and fees
176.613
cash and cash equivelents
11.529
investments
805.349
pledges recievable net
4.022
unrestricted net assets
388.183
permenantely restricted net assets
287.271
total debt
153.133
endowment 2015
789.354
endowment 2016
722.425
change in endowment
-8%
Ra3os
Opera/ng Revenue
222.481
Annual Change in Opera/ng Revnue
4,325786848
Opera/ng Income
3.244
Opera/ng Cash Flow Margin
12,28464453
Revenue Diversity
79,38340802
Total Cash and Investments
816.878
Spendable Cash and Investments to Opera/ng Expenses
3,74
Monthly Days Cash on Hand
705,70
Spendable Cash and Investments to Total Debt
3,484742022
Total debt to Cash Flow
5,602905126

Bucknell: Currently (Aa2)
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity

Outcome
A
A
Aa
A
Ba
Aa
Aa
Aaa
Aa
Aa
Score
6
6
3
6
12

FY 2015
213.256
205.637
17.524
2.274
170.879
21.276
819.817
4.086
423.523
261.448
157.855

213.256
3,327212206
7.619
12,85637919
80,12857786
841.093
4,11
821,77
3,697893637
5,757559179

Outcome
A
Baa
Aa
A
Ba
Aa
Aa
Aaa
Aa
Aa
Score
6
9
3
6
12

FY 2014
206389
200.780
16.611
2.349
165.547
9.219
824.852
4.042
430.600
252.564
180.829

206.389
#DIV/0!
5.609
11,9042197
80,21115466
834.071
4,174285287
853,3955226
3,238136582
7,360047214

Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Total Score
Preliminary Outcome

3
3
3
3
1
1
3
3
3
3
Weight
Weight
15%
15%
5%
5%
10%
10%
10%
10%
15%
15%
10%
10%
10%
10%
5%
5%
10%
10%
10%
10%
Weighted ScoreWeighted Score
0,9
0,9
0,3
0,45
0,3
0,3
0,6
0,6
1,8
1,8
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,05
0,05
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,3
5,15
5,3
A1
A1

FY 2016
Colby College
Net assets released from restric/ons
total revnue
139.950
total expenses
136.769
deprecia/on
10.490
interest
7.423
tu//on and fees
116.542
cash and cash equivelents
31.817
investments
893.587
pledges recievable net
18.905
unrestricted net assets
358.054
permenantely restricted net assets
394.822
total debt
202.854
endowment 2015
745.957
endowment 2016
710.659
change in endowment
-5%
Ra3os
Opera/ng Revenue
139.950
Annual Change in Opera/ng Revnue
8,788594882
Opera/ng Income
3.181
Opera/ng Cash Flow Margin
15,0725259
Revenue Diversity
83,27402644
Total Cash and Investments
925.404
Spendable Cash and Investments to Opera/ng Expenses
6,904408163
Monthly Days Cash on Hand
1034,928294
Spendable Cash and Investments to Total Debt
2,708780699
Total debt to Cash Flow
9,616668247

Colby: Currently (Aa2)
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity

Outcome
A
Aaa
Aaa
Aa
Ba
Aa
Aaa
Aaa
Aa
A
Score
6
1
1
3
12

FY 2015
128.644
127.795
9.442
2.231
111.549
7.060
936.774
21.769
366.541
384.445
205.997

128.644
6,613405821
849
9,733839122
86,71138957
943.834
7,555874643
1130,410425
2,821196425
16,45080658

Outcome
A
Aa
Aa
A
Ba
Aa
Aaa
Aaa
Aa
Baa
Score
6
3
3
6
12

FY 2014
120664
116.458
8.118
3.023
106.576
19.331
829.344
21.166
363.925
375.333
106.477

120.664
#DIV/0!
4.206
12,71878937
88,32460386
848.675
7,469139089
1226,071857
4,644270594
6,937968333

Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Total Score
Preliminary Outcome

3
3
1
1
1
1
3
3
6
9
Weight
Weight
15%
15%
5%
5%
10%
10%
10%
10%
15%
15%
10%
10%
10%
10%
5%
5%
10%
10%
10%
10%
Weighted ScoreWeighted Score
0,9
0,9
0,05
0,15
0,1
0,3
0,3
0,6
1,8
1,8
0,3
0,3
0,1
0,1
0,05
0,05
0,3
0,3
0,6
0,9
4,5
5,4
Aa3
A1

FY 2016
Bates College
Net assets released from restric/ons
total revnue
110.628
total expenses
104.575
deprecia/on
6.608
interest
4.864
tu//on and fees
109.765
cash and cash equivelents
17.870
investments
289.478
pledges recievable net
1.912
unrestricted net assets
124.088
permenantely restricted net assets
181.129
total debt
99.765
endowment 2015
261.501
endowment 2016
250.976
change in endowment
-4%
Ra3os
Opera/ng Revenue
110.628
Annual Change in Opera/ng Revnue
0,583597665
Opera/ng Income
6.053
Opera/ng Cash Flow Margin
15,84124539
Revenue Diversity
99,22019176
Total Cash and Investments
307.347
Spendable Cash and Investments to Opera/ng Expenses
2,957311604
Monthly Days Cash on Hand
462,3191785
Spendable Cash and Investments to Total Debt
1,284331768
Total debt to Cash Flow
5,692753349

Bates: Currently (A1)
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity

Outcome
A
Ba
A
Aa
Ca
A
Aa
Aa
A
Aa
Score
6
12
6
3
20

FY 2015
109.986
103.404
6.550
5.176
106.426
12.460
301.732
2.404
122.922
158.439
101.470

109.986
8,521815934
6.582
16,64511275
96,76286169
314.191
3,061721007
463,2357176
1,558642242
5,542614953

Outcome
A
Aaa
A
Aa
Caa
A
Aa
Aa
A
Aa
Score
6
1
6
3
18

FY 2014
101349,408
100.958
6.527
3.438
72.520
10.417
302.654
2.047
121.418
153.675
109.373

101.349
#DIV/0!
392
10,2188737
71,55416339
313.071
3,121282132
469,3128827
1,476067883
10,56056851

Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Scope of opera/ons
Reputa/on and Pricing Power
Strategic Posi/oning
Opera/ng Results
Revenue diversity
Total wealth
Opera/ng Reserve
liquidity
Financial Leverage
Debt aﬀorability
Total Score
Preliminary Outcome

6
6
3
3
3
3
6
6
3
3
Weight
Weight
15%
15%
5%
5%
10%
10%
10%
10%
15%
15%
10%
10%
10%
10%
5%
5%
10%
10%
10%
10%
Weighted ScoreWeighted Score
0,9
0,9
0,6
0,05
0,6
0,6
0,3
0,3
3
2,7
0,6
0,6
0,3
0,3
0,15
0,15
0,6
0,6
0,3
0,3
7,35
6,5
A3
A2

Applications

Union

Bates

F&M

Bucknell

Hamilton

15 - 16

5996

5651

7146

10487

5230

14 - 15

5406

5044

5472

10967

5434

13 - 14

5725

5243

5347

7864

5071

12 - 13

5565

4906

5174

7947

5107

11 - 12

5151

5196

5105

8291

5265

Number Accepted

Union

Bates

F&M

Bucknell

Hamilton

15 - 16

2297

1231

2305

3138

1364

14 - 15

2223

1282

2130

2718

1348

13 - 14

2134

1267

1936

2416

1336

12 - 13

2127

1304

2034

2345

1389

11 - 12

2197

1405

1965

2238

1441

Total enrolled

Union

Bates

F&M

Bucknell

Hamilton

15 - 16

568

517

592

950

472

14 - 15

570

491

591

938

473

13 - 14

559

500

605

939

469

12 - 13

591

503

600

933

469

11 - 12

572

502

597

918

481

Selectivity

Union

Bates

F&M

Bucknell

Hamilton

15 - 16

38,31%

21,78%

32,26%

29,92%

26,08%

14 - 15

41,12%

25,42%

38,93%

24,78%

24,81%

13 - 14

37,28%

24,17%

36,21%

30,72%

26,35%

12 - 13

38,22%

26,58%

39,31%

29,51%

27,20%

11 - 12

42,65%

27,04%

38,49%

26,99%

27,37%

Matriculation

Union

Bates

F&M

Bucknell

Hamilton

15 - 16

24,73%

42,00%

25,68%

30,27%

34,60%

14 - 15

25,64%

38,30%

27,75%

34,51%

35,09%

13 - 14

26,19%

39,46%

31,25%

38,87%

35,10%

12 - 13

27,79%

38,57%

29,50%

39,79%

33,77%

11 - 12

26,04%

35,73%

30,38%

41,02%

33,38%

% increase yr over yr

Union

Bates

F&M

Bucknell

Hamilton

15 - 16

10,91%

12,03%

30,59%

-4,38%

-3,75%

14 - 15

-5,57%

-3,80%

2,34%

39,46%

7,16%

13 - 14

2,88%

6,87%

3,34%

-1,04%

-0,70%

8,04%

-5,58%

1,35%

-4,15%

-3,00%

16,40%

8,76%

39,98%

26,49%

-0,66%

12 - 13
Overall % increase

Bibliography
Ainlay, Stephen. “Important Campus Announcement.” 3 March 2017, Union College, Nott
Memorial.
Annual Bonds Sales. Bond Buyer. 3 November 2016.
http://www.bondbuyer.com/apps/custom/msa_search.php?product=decade_bondvolume
Blake, Diane, Kabalian, Mary Beth. Personal Interview. 1 February 2017.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity
Rate [DGS10], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS10, March 6, 2017.
“Board of Regents, State of Iowa Dormitory Revenue Bonds, Series S.U.I. 2017 (The State
University of Iowa).” 23 March 2017. Retrieved from <
http://emma.msrb.org/EP983180-EP762548-EP1164330.pdf>
“Board of Regents, State of Iowa Dormitory Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series I.S.U. 2017
(Iowa State University of Science and Technology).” 23 March 2017. Retrieved from <
http://emma.msrb.org/EP983105-EP762484-EP1164270.pdf>
Bolduc, Kim. “Union STEM programs proves that science need not gender-discriminate.” 12
January 2017. < http://www.concordy.com/opinions/2017/01/union-stem-programsprove-that-science-need-not-gender-discriminate/>
Bowman, Woods. 2002. The uniqueness of nonprofit finance and the decision to borrow.
Nonprofit Management and Leadership 12 (3): 293-311.
David L. Hoffland. "The Price-Rating Structure of the Municipal Bond Market." Financial
Analysts Journal28, no. 2 (1972): 65-70. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4470906
"Delaware County Authority (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) Haverford College Revenue
Bonds Series 2017A." 28 Feb 2017. Retrieved from
<http://emma.msrb.org/IssueView/IssueDetails.aspx?id=ES377932>
Denison, Dwight, Jacob Fowles, and Michael J. Moody. 2014. Borrowing for college: A
comparison of Long-Term debt financing between public and private, nonprofit
institutions of higher education. Public Budgeting & Finance 34 (2): 84-104.
Electronic municipal market access. 2016 [cited 11/10 2016]. Available from
http://www.emma.msrb.org/.

64

Ely, Todd, Martell, Christine, and Kioko, Shannon. “Determinants of the Credit Rating Fee in
the Municipal Bond Market.” Public Finance publications. 33: 25–48.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2013.12000.x.
Gailen Hite, and Arthur Warga. "The Effect of Bond-Rating Changes on Bond Price
Performance."Financial Analysts Journal 53, no. 3 (1997): 35-51.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4479995
Guibaud, Stéphane, Yves Nosbusch, and Dimitri Vayanos. 2013. Bond market clienteles, the
yield curve, and the optimal maturity structure of government debt. Review of Financial
Studies 26 (8): 1914-61.
Hand, John R. M., Robert W. Holthausen, and Richard W. Leftwich. 1992. The effect of bond
rating agency announcements on bond and stock prices. The Journal of Finance 47 (2):
733.
Kabalian, Mary Beth. Personal Interview. 6 February 2017.
Kedem, Karen. 2015. Moody's global higher education rating methodology, eds. Susan
Fitzgerald, Kendra Smith, Bart Oosterveld, Michael Take and David Rubinoff.
Kliger, Doron, and Oded Sarig. "The Information Value of Bond Ratings." The Journal of
Finance 55, no. 6 (2000): 2879-902. http://www.jstor.org/stable/222405.
Kowarski, Ilana. 10 Universities with the Biggest Endowments. U.S. News and World Report. 4
October 2016.
Kanczuk, Fabio, and Laura Alfaro. 2009. Debt maturity: Is long-term debt optimal? Review of
International Economics 17 (5): 890-905.
Law, J Damiyo.(Ed.), A Dictionary of Business and Management. : Oxford University Press.
Retrieved 6 Oct. 2016.
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199684984.001.0001/acref9780199684984-e-1720.
Langohr, Herwig, and Langohr, Patricia. The Wiley Finance Series : The Rating Agencies and
Their Credit Ratings : What They Are, How They Work, and Why They are Relevant (1).
Hoboken, GB: Wiley, 2010. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 6 October 2016.
McDonald, Michael, Smith, Kate. “Little Good News for the Little Ivies.” Bloomberg Business
Week. 22 December 2016. < https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-1222/little-good-news-for-the-little-ivies>
Miao, Hong, Sanjay Ramchander, and Tianyang Wang. 2014. "The Response of Bond Prices to
Insurer Ratings Changes." Geneva Papers on Risk & Insurance 39 (2): 389-413.

65

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/gpp.2013.21.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1516293781?accountid=14637.
National liberal arts colleges rankings. in U.S. News and World Report [database online]. 2016
[cited 11/10 2016]. Available from http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/bestcolleges/rankings/national-liberal-arts-colleges.
O'Hara, Neil, Judy Wesalo Temel, and Ebook Library. 2012. The fundamentals of municipal
bonds. 6th ed. Hoboken, N.J: Wiley.
Sharma, Pranav, Gephardt, Dennis. “Moody's assigns A1 to Union College, NY's $26M Ser.
2015A Bonds; outlook stable.” 25 August 2012.
Shibata, Takashi, and Michi Nishihara. 2015. Investment timing, debt structure, and financing
constraints. European Journal of Operational Research 241 (2): 513-26.
SIFMA; Sifma, (2011). The Fundamentals of Municipal Bonds. Retrieved from
http://www.eblib.com
Sinder, Susannaha. 2015. “10 Universities With the Largest Financial Endowments.” U.S. News
and World Report. http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/the-short-listcollege/articles/2013/10/01/universities-with-the-largest-financial-endowments-collegeswith-the-largest-financial-endowments .
S&P global ratings methodology not-for-profit public and private colleges and universites. in
S&P [database online]. Online, 2016 [cited 11/10 2016]. Available
from https://www.globalcreditportal.com/ratingsdirect/renderArticle.do?articleId=15586
60&SctArtId=362948&from=CM&nsl_code=LIME&sourceObjectId=9389754&source
RevId=1&fee_ind=N&exp_date=20260105-22:24:02.
Townsley, Michael K., and National Association of College and University Business Officers.
2008. Managing debt and capital investments: A toolbox for private colleges and
universitiesNational Association of College and University Business Officers.
Union College Website. Cited [2/9/2017]. Available from < https://www.union.edu/>
Yan, Wenli, Dwight V. Denison, and J. S. Butler. 2009; 2008. Revenue structure and nonprofit
borrowing. Public Finance Review 37 (1): 47-67.

66

